Machine Learning in an Auction Environment

Patrick Hummel, R. Preston McAfee; 17(197):1−37, 2016.

Abstract

We consider a model of repeated online auctions in which an ad with an uncertain click-through rate faces a random distribution of competing bids in each auction and there is discounting of payoffs. We formulate the optimal solution to this explore/exploit problem as a dynamic programming problem and show that efficiency is maximized by making a bid for each advertiser equal to the advertiser's expected value for the advertising opportunity plus a term proportional to the variance in this value divided by the number of impressions the advertiser has received thus far. We then use this result to illustrate that the value of incorporating active exploration in an auction environment is exceedingly small.

[abs][pdf][bib]




Home Page

Papers

Submissions

News

Editorial Board

Announcements

Proceedings

Open Source Software

Search

Statistics

Login

Contact Us



RSS Feed